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TAKINGS FOR GRANTED: THE 
CONVERGENCE AND NON-COVERGENCE OF 
PROPERTY LAW IN THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC 
OF CHINA AND THE UNITED STATES 
DENNIS SCHMELZER* 
"My own view is that the leftist voices that have emerged are not going to disappear because we 
have a property law."
1
 
INTRODUCTION 
Of the myriad of new laws and regulations promulgated by the 
National People's Congress of the People's Republic of China 
("China") in March 2007, one captured the watchful eye of Western 
media sources: China's new property law ("Property Law").2 One 
report described the law as "an important step away from Communist 
collective ownership and towards a market economy" that will 
"undoubtedly increase protection for home owners and prevent land 
seizures."3 Time Magazine was similarly optimistic, emphasizing that 
"reforming the old socialist system is exactly the point of the law, 
individual property rights being a core tenet of a functioning capitalist 
economy."4 As these examples illustrate, Western news coverage has 
essentially depicted the law as representative of a major convergence 
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 1. Joseph Kahn, China Approves Property Law, Strengthening Its Middle Class, N.Y. 
TIMES, Mar. 16, 2007, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/03/16/world/asia/16-
china.html *quoting Zhu Xueqin, a Chinese historian and government expert). 
 2. Property Rights Law (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat'l People's Cong., Mar. 
16, 2007, effective Oct. 1, 2007), translated in http://www.lehmanlaw.com/fileadmin/lehmanlaw 
_com/laws___regulations/Propoerty_Rights_Law_of_the_PRC__LLX__03162007.pdf (last visi-
ted Oct. 13, 2008) (P.R.C.) [hereinafter China's New Property Law].  This is the unofficial 
translation of the full law as provided by Chinese law firm Lehman, Lee, & Xu.  An official 
translation is not yet available. 
 3. China Passes New Law on Property, BBC NEWS, Mar. 16, 2007, http://news.bbc.co.uk-
/2/hi/ asia-pacific/6456959.stm. 
 4. Simon Elegant, China Gets a Property Rights Law, TIME, Mar. 16, 2007, 
http://www.time .com/time/world/article/0,8599,1599932,00.html. 
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of Chinese property law with the standards of laws embraced by free-
market economies like the United States. 
Of course, given the complexity of property laws, vast differences 
remain between the property laws of many Western free-market 
states, let alone between the property laws of China and those of the 
countries commonly associated with the Western legal tradition. 
There is one area in particular, however, in which convergence is 
apparent between Chinese and U.S. property law: the law of takings. 
While the United States and China have reached similar 
solutions to takings law questions, close study of the evolution of this 
law in each country suggests that these solutions, while startlingly 
similar, are based on different ideological principles and address 
radically different problems.  This note proceeds to examine how and 
to what extent U.S. and Chinese laws have converged in these areas. 
Part I sets forth a basic overview of the roots of the law of takings in 
the United States and China. Part II examines two recent cases 
involving challenges to government takings in the United States and 
China to illustrate that the legal solutions to takings law questions 
have converged in both jurisdictions. Finally, Part III considers the 
institutional, economic, and social forces that have driven this 
evolution in both systems. 
Ultimately, this note concludes that the convergence upon 
similar standards and solutions in takings law is a deceptive unity. If 
anything, close study of this legal evolution demonstrates that, while 
the United States and China have adopted similar solutions and are 
now faced with common problems and questions, this practical policy 
convergence has not been accompanied by a convergence of 
ideologies or purpose. As such, observers would be wise to look 
beyond the common language currently embraced by both 
jurisdictions and more closely examine the ideological drivers of the 
legal evolution to predict how property law in both jurisdictions is 
likely to evolve in the future. 
I.  U.S. TAKINGS LAW & TAKINGS LAW WITH CHINESE 
CHARACTERISTICS 
While the convergence of property law in China and the United 
States may be noted in several areas, the most striking example 
involves takings law, or the law that governs when local, state, or 
federal governments are allowed to take private property. In the 
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United States, takings law is rooted in the U.S. Constitution's Fifth 
Amendment,5 which states "nor shall private property be taken for 
public use, without just compensation."6 This clause allows for public 
takings of private property under U.S. law while also setting 
limitations on those takings; any property taken must be for "public 
use" and accompanied by "just compensation"—terms that have 
guided takings law and have been the source of challenges to it since 
the Amendment's passage.7 With amendments to the Chinese 
Constitution in 2004 and the recent passage of China's new Property 
Law, China has developed a similar takings law. 
Government takings are nothing new to China. With the 
establishment of the People's Republic of China in 1949, the Chinese 
government established in law its right to take private property, 
confiscating much of the private property held within the Chinese 
mainland.8 Indeed, until 2004 the nation's constitution still recognized 
the state's right to take private land in the public interest without 
compensation. According to Article 10 of the Chinese Constitution, 
"[t]he State may, in the public interest, requisition land for its use in 
accordance with the law."9 At the same time, the absence of any 
mention of compensation in the Chinese text gave the word "taking" 
a more literal meaning.10 Widespread abuse of this power by local 
authorities led the National People's Congress to amend Article 10 to 
read "[t]he State may, in the public interest and in accordance with 
law, expropriate or requisition land for its use and make 
compensation for the land expropriated or requisitioned."11 At the 
time, since this guarantee did not provide more guidance, widespread 
 
 5. See JESSE DUKEMINIER & JAMES E. KRIER, PROPERTY 1093 (5th ed. 2002). 
 6. U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
 7. See DUKEMINER & KRIER, supra note 5, at 1093. 
 8. See CAO PEI, REAL ESTATE LAW IN CHINA 12 (1998). 
 9. Amendment to the Constitution (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat'l People's 
Cong., Mar. 14, 2004), art. 20, translated in http://www.npc.cn/englishnpc/Consti-
tution/node_2826.htm (last visited Oct. 4, 2008) (P.R.C.) (containing the original text of Article 
10 within the amending text of Article 20) [hereinafter Amendment to the Constitution]. 
 10. See, e.g., Ownership with Chinese Characteristics: Private Prop. Rights and Land 
Reform in the P.R.C.: Roundtable before the Cong.-Executive Comm'n on China, 108th Cong. 
28-29 (2003) (statement of Patrick A. Randolph, Jr., Professor of Law, Univ. of Mo. at Kan. 
City), available at  http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=108_house_hear-
ings&docid=f:86630.pdf [hereinafter Overview] (noting that land could be taken by 
"government fiat"). 
 11. Amendment to the Constitution, supra note 9, art. 20. 
_SCHMELZER_FMT6.DOC 11/25/2008  3:28:29 PM 
136 DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol 19:133 
evictions and seizures continued, along with growing protests against 
those seizures.12 
In response, key parts of the new Property Law passed in March 
2007 go beyond guarantees of compensation for takings to further 
define exactly what compensation is due.13 In fact, the Property Law, 
officially "an important component part of the civil code,"14 goes into 
such depth that its Chinese version contains 247 articles across 40 
pages.15 While there is no equivalent federal law defining the contours 
of the Fifth Amendment's Takings Clause, the Chinese law can 
readily be compared with the contours as defined by over two 
centuries of Fifth Amendment jurisprudence.16 
Through such a comparison, a case can be made that Western 
media sources are correct: the Property Law, along with its formal 
explanation, presents a convergence with U.S. takings jurisprudence. 
This is particularly the case considering recent takings jurisprudence, 
as exemplified by a comparison of the "Nail House" case in China 
with the U.S. Supreme Court's 2005 decision in Kelo v. City of New 
London.17 
II.  PARADIGMATIC CASES: FROM "NAIL HOUSE" TO NEW 
LONDON 
Prior to the passage of the new Chinese Property Law, one case 
had risen to fame throughout the Chinese media as a national symbol 
of the struggle of ordinary people against the evictions and 
expropriations that had become widespread across China over the 
last decade.18 This case, dubbed the "Nail House," involved a husband 
and wife in the city of Chongqing who were determined to save their 
 
 12. Howard W. French, Land of 74,000 Protests (But Little Is Ever Fixed), N.Y. TIMES, 
Aug. 24, 2005, at A4, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2005/08/24/international/as-
ia/24letter.html?oref=logi n. 
 13. Explanation on Draft Property Law, 5th Nat'l People's Cong. 10 (2007) (statement of 
Wang Zhaoguo, vice-chairman of the Standing Comm. Of the Nat'l People's Cong.), available at 
http://www. 10thnpc.org.cn/english/government/202091.htm [hereinafter Wang Zhaoguo]. 
 14. See id. at § 3(1). 
 15. Charles Hutzler, China Introduces Landmark Property Law, CINCINNATI POST, Mar. 8, 
2007, at A13, available at 2007 WLNR 4466275. 
 16. See, e.g., Joseph Dainow, The Civil Law and the Common Law: Some Points of 
Comparison, 15 AM. J. COMP. L. 419, 423-27 (1967) (discussing how civil and common law 
systems can be compared as a matter of functional equivalence, as well as some inherent 
problems in making such comparisons). 
 17. 545 U.S. 469 (2005). 
 18. See Lessons from 'Nail House,' CHINA DAILY, Apr. 4, 2007, http://www.chinadaily. 
com.cn/opinion/2007-04/04/content_843001.htm [hereinafter Lessons]. 
_SCHMELZER_FMT6.DOC 11/25/2008  3:28:29 PM 
2008] PROPERTY LAW IN CHINA & THE UNITED STATES 137 
home from expropriation without adequate compensation.19 Out of 
280 residents, they were alone in resisting the eviction order.20 Their 
two-year legal battle to save their property might have gone 
unnoticed in China if not for the photographs of their home that 
emerged in online sources, which made the building look like a nail 
that could not be pulled out of the construction site.21 Its defiant 
image captured the admiration of many.22 
Ultimately, the Nail House plaintiffs won their fight for increased 
compensation through a court-approved settlement after the passage 
of the new Property Law.23 Even though the new Property Law did 
not technically take effect until October 1, 2007, within a week of the 
law's passage the Chinese media had already connected the two.24 As 
soon as the National People's Congress made it clear that private 
individuals have a right to adequate compensation for resettlement, 
the developers got the message and decided it was in their interest to 
quickly settle—a move that was seen by many as a major milestone in 
Chinese private property protection.25 A former Nail House neighbor 
summarized this change with a brief observation: "In the past they 
would have just knocked [the house] down."26 
Just as Nail House is seen as a landmark case for takings law in 
China, Kelo v. City of New London,27 a Supreme Court case decided 
in 2005, is seen as a landmark case for takings law in the United 
States. Kelo resulted in a "firestorm of public resentment" from angry 
critics who "bemoaned 'the death of private property.'"28 At issue in 
Kelo was whether the economically "distressed municipality" of New 
London, Connecticut, could condemn and seize fifteen non-blighted 
homes as part of an economic redevelopment plan provided that just 
 
 19. £260,000 Brings China's Best-Known House Down, TIMES ONLINE, Apr. 3, 2007,  
http:// www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/asia/article1608437.ece [hereinafter House Down]. 
 20. Id. 
 21. See id. 
 22. Id. 
 23. Id. 
 24. See, e.g., Zhang Rui, First Test Case for Newly Approved Property Law?, 
CHINA.ORG.CN, Mar. 23, 2007, http://www.china.org.cn/english/China/204173.htm. 
 25. See Howard W. French, Homeowner Stares Down Wreckers, at Least for a While, N.Y. 
TIMES, Mar. 27, 2007, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/03/27/world/asia/27china.html?_ 
r=1&ref=asia&oref=slogin [hereinafter Chongqing Journal]. 
 26. Id. 
 27. 545 U.S. 469 (2005). 
 28. Judy Coleman, The Powers of a Few, the Anger of the Many, WASH. POST, Oct. 9, 2005, 
at B2, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/10/07/AR-
20051007023 35.html. 
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compensation was paid to property owners.29 The Court ultimately 
found this to be an acceptable public purpose within the meaning of 
the Takings Clause.30 
Ironically, while Nail House represents a rebirth of private 
property protection to many in China and Kelo represents the death 
of private property to some in the United States, the rule that 
emerges from both is surprisingly similar.  Indeed, both cases raise 
three issues in particular that deserve discussion. First, both raise the 
question of what constitutes "public interest" or "public use," and 
they arrive at a remarkably similar, albeit controversial, answer.  
Second, both raise the question of how to define just compensation. 
Third, both involve controversial takings of homes, raising the issue 
of what special place homes may have in relation to other properties. 
Each of these issues shall be discussed in turn. 
A.  "Public Interest" and "Public Use" 
When asked for the basis of their challenge against the eviction 
order authorizing the taking of their house, Wu Ping, the wife of the 
property owner, directly questioned the alleged "public interest" 
behind the taking, declaring that: 
The Constitution and the latest Property Law protect private 
property ownership. They said they were going to demolish 
our house because it is in the public interest. But they are 
going to build a shopping center, which has nothing to do 
with the public interest!  It is a business move, and what the 
[order] protects are the developers' interests!31 
These comments hit upon a key question in both the United States 
and China: when can property be taken from one private party and 
given to another in the name of "public use," "public interest," or 
"public purpose"? 
Much of the majority opinion in Kelo is dedicated to addressing 
this question in U.S. law.  As Justice Stevens wrote for the majority: 
[I]t has long been accepted that the sovereign may not take 
the property of A for the sole purpose of transferring it to 
another private party B, even though A is paid just 
compensation.  On the other hand, it is equally clear that a 
State may transfer property from one private party to 
 
 29. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 473, 475, 477. 
 30. Id. at 484. 
 31. Rui, supra note 24. 
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another if future "use by the public" is the purpose of the 
taking . . . .32 
While Stevens readily admits that this explanation does not answer 
the more complex issues raised by Kelo, it might perhaps suffice to 
answer the questions raised in the Nail House case. After all, while 
the Wu property was being transferred to private developers, it was 
known at the time that a "shopping mall will be built where their 
house now stands, each floor covering 5,000 square meters."33 Since a 
large shopping center would likely qualify as an establishment for use 
by the public under U.S. law as Stevens describes above,34 this would 
make the Nail House case less problematic for U.S. law. 
If the exact use of the Nail House property was not known, 
however, matters would be more complicated. This was the case in 
Kelo, which was "not a case in which the City [was] planning to open 
the condemned land—at least not in its entirety—to use by the 
general public."35 In Kelo, some of the properties taken would not 
offer services to the public at large.36  Nonetheless, Stevens upheld the 
taking, noting that the meaning of "public use" in the Fifth 
Amendment has long since recognized that the term need not mean 
literal "public use" and that a mere "public purpose" would suffice.37 
Accordingly, while residents of New London believed that the 
Constitution's terms meant that "cities have no right to take their 
land except for projects with a clear public use, such as roads or 
schools, or to revitalize blighted areas," 38 Justice Stevens expressed 
the Court's opinion to the contrary. Similarly, while Wu Ping felt that 
building a shopping center was not in the "public interest," city 
officials clearly disagreed.39 
Ultimately, Justice Stevens's majority opinion in Kelo held that 
the "public use" requirement is met where a city "has carefully 
formulated an economic development plan that it believes will 
provide appreciable benefits to the community, including—but by no 
 
 32. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 477. 
 33. Rui, supra note 24. 
 34. See Pruneyard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 83 (1980) (holding that a shopping 
center is open for use by the public at large). 
 35. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 478. 
 36. See id. 
 37. Id. at 480. 
 38. Homes May Be 'Taken' for Private Projects, MSNBC, June 23, 2005, 
http://www.msnbc.msn .com/id/8331097/ [hereinafter Homes May Be 'Taken']. 
 39. See House Down, supra note 19. 
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means limited to—new jobs and increased tax revenue."40 Similarly, 
the National People's Congress has also, since 1995, required that all 
expropriations in the public interest "must comply with land 
utilization master plans"41 and "be subject to strict urban planning, 
overall planning, rational distribution, [and] comprehensive 
development . . . on the basis of the principle of combining economic, 
social and environmental benefits."42 Given this language, it would 
seem inapposite whether Nail House was going to be replaced by a 
shopping mall open to all or by some other business less open to the 
public, as long as it is being taken as part of a plan. Similarly, the 
Supreme Court held that full public use of the land was not required 
for the takings in New London, Connecticut.43 Instead, 
comprehensive plans are paramount to the legality of takings in both 
countries, whether those plans involve building conference hotels and 
marinas in New London44 or "broad avenues" and "big shopping 
malls" in Chongqing.45 
That is not to say that this is without controversy in either 
country.  Just as Wu Ping became a hero46 among "Dingzihu" (those 
who resist government seizures for developers without adequate 
compensation) for her fight against the conflation of the term "public 
interest" with developers' interests,47 Justice Sandra Day O'Connor's 
stinging dissent to the Kelo opinion, joined by Justices Rehnquist, 
Scalia, and Thomas, has been used by property rights advocates for 
making the same point.48  O'Connor charged that, 
[T]he fallout from this decision will not be random. The 
beneficiaries are likely to be those citizens with 
disproportionate influence and power in the political 
process, including large corporations and development firms. 
As for the victims, the government now has license to 
transfer property from those with fewer resources to those 
 
 40. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 483. 
 41. Administration of Urban Real Property Law (promulgated by the Standing Comm. 
Nat'l People's Cong., July 5, 1994, effective Jan. 1, 1995), art. 9, translated in 5 THE PRC 
PROPERTY SERIES 5, 6 (Asia Law and Practice Ltd. ed., 1995) (P.R.C.) [hereinafter 
Administration of Urban Real Property Law]. 
 42. Id. art. 24. 
 43. See Kelo, 545 U.S. at 484. 
 44. Id. at 474. 
 45. Chongqing Journal, supra note 25. 
 46. House Down, supra note 19. 
 47. Rui, supra note 24. 
 48. Homes May Be 'Taken', supra note 38. 
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with more. The Founders cannot have intended this perverse 
result.49 
While the concerns expressed by Wu Ping and Justice O'Connor have 
not been enough to stop these takings, substantial agreement with 
their concerns in both the United States and the People's Republic of 
China suggest that the controversy over how to define "public 
interest" and "public use" will continue as the law continues to 
develop. 
B.  When is Compensation "Just"? 
In addition to raising questions about what constitutes a "public 
interest," both the Nail House and Kelo cases raise questions about 
whether compensation is "just." In China, what surprised local 
housing official Ren Zhongping most with Nail House was that Wu 
Ping would not accept the same compensation taken by 280 other 
property owners and determined reasonable by an official appraisal 
agency.50 As he noted, "[s]he has the value of her house in her heart, 
but what she has in mind is not practical."51 These comments refer to 
her desire, for instance, to "be compensated with a same-sized 
apartment" in the same location with the "same exposure to the 
sun."52 This irked developers and city officials alike, who called the 
demands unrealistic.53 Yet these concerns are similar to those of the 
New London residents who challenged the taking of their homes, 
fighting the condemnation of their properties because of their 
attachment to things like waterfront views.54 
Addressing these concerns, Justice Thomas' dissent noted that 
"[s]o-called 'urban renewal' programs provide some compensation 
for the properties they take, but no compensation is possible for the 
subjective value of these lands to the individuals displaced."55 Yet this 
is nothing new to U.S. law. Since United States v. Miller56 in 1943, the 
U.S. Supreme Court has rejected the idea of compensating 
 
 49. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 505 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). 
 50. Chongqing Journal, supra note 25. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Rui, supra note 24. 
 53. Id. 
 54. See Charles Lane, Justices Affirm Property Seizures, WASH. POST, June 24, 2005, at A1, 
available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/06/23/AR20050623007 
83 _pf.html. 
 55. Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 521 (2005) (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 56. 317 U.S. 369 (1943). 
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individuals for the personal value of their property, holding that the 
government must only pay fair market value to compensate for taking 
a property,57 or "what a willing buyer would pay in cash to a willing 
seller."58 Housing official Ren Zhongping seemed to believe that this 
type of compensation is all that is required by Chinese law as well, 
arguing that Wu Ping's demand for compensation beyond a 
professional appraisal of market value was "more than what is 
reasonable by law."59 
The text of China's new property law, however, suggests that Wu 
Ping's demands, while likely unreasonable in the United States 
according to five of nine Kelo justices, are more in line with the spirit 
of the new Chinese law than Chongqing's officials may think. Article 
42 of the new law provides, for instance, that "where [an] individual 
residential house is expropriated, the residential conditions of the 
expropriated shall be guaranteed" along with "compensations for 
demolition and resettlement."60  Of course, this provision turns on 
what "residential conditions" means; if apartment size and sun 
exposure qualify as "residential conditions," then Wu Ping could be 
well within her rights to demand that these conditions are guaranteed. 
The official explanation further cites the protection of "living 
conditions" as well, including resettlement costs61—neither of which 
would be required of U.S. developers seeking to displace tenants.  
Instead, 
[I]n the United States, residential tenants sometimes get 
sketchy relocation assistance when urban renewal comes but 
hardly ever are provided with a new home. Their landlords 
typically get most of the cash, as the lease contracts either 
are terminated before the condemnation or provide that 
condemnation will terminate the lease rights automatically.62 
While the United States primarily grants compensation to the person 
who owns the land in fee simple absolute, such a solution would make 
little sense in China given that most Chinese tenants received only a 
permanent right to residence rather than outright ownership of their 
 
 57. See id. at 374-75. 
 58. Id. at 374.  See also DUKEMINIER & KRIER, supra note 5, .at 1114. 
 59. Rui, supra note 24. 
 60. China's New Property Law, supra note 2. 
 61. Wang Zhaoguo, supra note 13, § 3(6). 
 62. Patrick A. Randolph Jr., The New Chinese Property Law, PROB. & PROP. 14, 20 (Sept.-
Oct. 2007). 
_SCHMELZER_FMT6.DOC 11/25/2008  3:28:29 PM 
2008] PROPERTY LAW IN CHINA & THE UNITED STATES 143 
homes under the privatizations of the 1990s.63 Accordingly, in the 
absence of any well-defined right to ownership, the value of the 
property to most Chinese tenants is much more tied to the right of 
residency itself. 
While the Chinese text might go further in some ways than 
current U.S. law to compensate tenants who lose their homes to 
takings, it remains to be seen whether this difference will exist in 
practice. This is particularly the case if the Nail House settlement is 
any indication of how the law will be enforced. After all, Wu Ping, 
while receiving greater financial compensation than she was initially 
offered, did not ultimately obtain the other conditions she originally 
demanded.64 And even though the new property law now provides a 
legal basis to challenge compensation in court, it is unclear whether 
the majority of Chinese property owners, whose cases are not subject 
to as much publicity as Nail House, would be able to wage a 
successful case against inadequate compensation. These problems are 
further compounded by the lack of a truly independent Chinese 
judiciary.65 There may be a reason, after all, that Wu Ping, while 
believing the new law was on her side, ultimately decided to settle. 
Others, however, may be more willing to test the law in the near 
future. Already, there have been reports of "many 'nail houses' that 
have sprung up over China . . . since the introduction of a property 
law last year."66 Though inspired by Wu Ping's battle to sustain her 
own fight, some claim that they will not follow her example in 
accepting less than replacement costs.  Choi Chu-cheung, for 
example, is a property owner in the city of Shenzhen whose "nail 
house" is the last obstacle blocking the construction of a new eighty-
 
 63. See id. at 159. 
 64. See House Down, supra note 19. 
 65. See, e.g., Zhu Suli, Political Parties in China's Judiciary, 17 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 
533, 539 (2007). See also Alex Pasternack, Old Beijing Tries to Avoid Wrecking Ball, CHRISTIAN 
SCI. MONITOR, Aug. 14, 2008, available at http://features.csmonitor.com/olympics08/2008/08/14/ 
old-beijing-tries-to-avoid-wrecking-ball/ (noting that legal expert Su Nan recommended against 
bringing takings challenges to the courts "not least because judges are often influenced by the 
government"). 
 66. Michael Bristow, Stand-off at Beijing 'Nail House', BBC NEWS, July 16, 2008, available 
at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/7509614.stm. See also Land Can Still Be Seized, Says 
Legal Expert, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Dec. 28, 2007, at 4, available at 2007 WLNR 25521767 
(noting that, though it is an uphill battle for landowners, "there have been sporadic successes in 
disgruntled landowners' fights against property developers" since the new Property Law was 
passed). 
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eight story tower.67 While Wu Ping ultimately accepted less than 
replacement cost, Choi Chu-cheung has claimed that he will hold out 
until he receives fair compensation or "land of equal value."68  How 
such replacement costs would differ from fair market value, and how 
successful citizens are in obtaining those replacement costs, remains 
to be seen. What is clear is that, as in the United States, "the real fight 
[in China] . . . will be over compensation . . . ."69 
C.  Home is Where the Heart is 
Both the U.S. and Chinese national constitutions separate homes 
from other properties as worthy of special mention and protection. 
The Fourth Amendment of the U.S. constitution, for instance, 
guarantees "[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, 
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and 
seizures," specifically singling out houses as protected from 
unreasonable search and seizure along with papers and other 
unnamed effects.70 This Amendment reflects the common law 
principle that an individual's home is his or her castle.71 Yet this is not 
a purely common law concept; the Chinese constitution of 1982 has a 
similar provision which states that "[t]he residences of citizens of the 
People's Republic of China are inviolable. Unlawful search of, or 
intrusion into, a citizen's residence is prohibited."72 With these 
provisions, one might ask whether homes have a significant place in 
Chinese and U.S. takings law as well.  Given that the two most recent 
prominent cases in takings law in the United States and China, the 
Nail House case and Kelo, involved takings of homes, these cases 
present a good opportunity to question whether the taking of homes 
raises additional problems for government takings. 
 
 67. See Stephanie Wong, Home Holdout Is New Test of China Property Law, YAHOO FIN., 
Apr. 15, 2007, available at http://uk.biz.yahoo.com/15042007/323/home-holdout-new-test-china-
property-law.html. 
 68. See id.; see also Zhuang Pinghui, 'Nail house' Blogger Is Homeowners' Hope, S. CHINA 
MORNING POST, Apr. 29,  2007, at 6, available at 2007 WLNR 8070764 (indicating Choi Chu-
cheung's insistence on fair compensation). 
 69. Randolph, supra note 62, at 19. See also Pinghui, supra note 68 (reporting several other 
instances of disputes over compensation). 
 70. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 71. See, e.g., Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325, 329 (1990) (quoting Buie v. State, 531 A.2d 
1290, 1297 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1987)). 
 72. XIAN FA [Constitution] art. 39 (2004) (P.R.C.), translated in http://www.npc.gov.cn/ 
englishnpc/Constitution/2007-11/15/content_1372964.htm (last visited Oct. 4, 2008) [hereinafter 
XIAN FA]. 
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The taking of homes, while currently allowed by the law of both 
countries, is more controversial than other takings and probably more 
likely to result in successful legal challenges. Justice Thomas' dissent 
in Kelo, for instance, speaks adamantly against "the indignity inflicted 
by uprooting [individuals] from their homes."73 What Thomas does 
not mention in his opinion, however, is that five of the fifteen 
properties involved in Kelo were not homes of those challenging the 
taking, but rather, properties held as business investments.74 Thomas 
chooses to focus on those properties that are individual homes, 
though, as a particularly egregious form of taking.  Likewise, 
American news articles focus on the taking of homes, also setting 
aside the question of the investment properties altogether.75 
Similarly, the Chinese media focused heavily in their coverage of 
Nail House on the fact that Wu Ping and her husband were seeking to 
protect their home, with only passing mention of the fact that the 
"family used to run a restaurant business from home."76 Rarely was it 
mentioned that a major reason that Wu Ping turned down previous 
compensation offers was because "she wanted lower levels in the new 
building so she could run her restaurant."77 Yet what sparked national 
interest was Wu Ping's fight to keep her home. 
The idea that homes deserve special protection under takings law 
has not been confined to dissenting opinions or media reports; 
instead, U.S. and Chinese law has, at times, been specifically drafted 
to offer special protection to homes in recognition of the idea that the 
taking of homes is more serious than other takings. One famous 
example in U.S. law is the house of Margaret Scattergood, which the 
government tried to take in 1961 because its 32.5 acres "jutted like an 
iceberg into the tract where the CIA planned its compound" in 
Langley, Virginia.78 Since the use of land for a government agency 
headquarters was clearly a public use, President Eisenhower and CIA 
Director Allen Dulles were well within their authority when they 
authorized the government to take the property and pay 
compensation amounting to $54,189.79 Not deterred by the President's 
 
 73. Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 521 (2005) (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 74. Id. at 475 (Stevens, J., majority). 
 75. See, e.g., Homes May Be 'Taken', supra note 38. 
 76. Rui, supra note 24. 
 77. Clifford Coonan, A Chinese Man's Home Is His Castle, INDEP. (U.K.), Mar. 31, 2007, at 
42. 
 78. RONALD KESSLER, INSIDE THE CIA 178 (1992). 
 79. See id. at 178-79. 
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authority, Scattergood lobbied Congress to save her home, and her 
story was so compelling to Congressmen that her effort resulted in an 
individual law passed by Congress allowing her the right to remain in 
her house until her death a good twenty-five years later.80 
While an extraordinary event, the Scattergood case demonstrates 
a natural reluctance among American policymakers to remove 
somebody from his or her home, even for good reason. Chinese 
policymakers from 1949 to 1979 did not have such qualms; during this 
period the People's Republic of China confiscated hundreds of 
thousands of homes across the country through a series of different 
initiatives that were part of its socialist transformation.81 By 1979, 
seventy-four percent of all urban buildings were state-owned housing 
units that had been confiscated.82 
Far from guaranteeing fair housing as intended, these policies, by 
the 1980s, had led to overcrowding and poor maintenance of public 
housing along with an "enormous financial burden on the state."83 
Since individuals were guaranteed low-cost public housing, they had 
no incentive to invest in or build housing for themselves – resulting in 
a massive housing shortage.84  To address that housing shortage, 
localities began to experiment with privatizing housing to encourage 
people to build and invest in their own residences, and "several years 
of investigation and experience" led to full-fledged urban housing 
reform and privatization as a way to reduce the burdens on the public 
housing system.85 As a result of the success of this system in raising 
standards of living, the National People's Congress included specific 
protections of private housing in the Property Law to further 
encourage people to invest in their homes.86  While these provisions 
were based on considerations of practical efficiency rather than a 
natural reluctance to remove people from their homes, they provide a 
legal text that can now be used before a court as an additional reason 
to challenge government takings that involve private homes. 
That said, their status as private homes, while gaining more 
attention in the media, did not ultimately protect Nail House or the 
homes in New London from being taken by local governments for 
 
 80. See id. at 178-80. 
 81. PEI, supra note 8, at 4-7. 
 82. Id. at 7. 
 83. Id. at 36. 
 84. Id. 
 85. See id. at 36-49. 
 86. Wang Zhaoguo, supra note 13, § 3(5). 
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local development projects. Accordingly, while both societies may 
single out homes as worthy of additional protection, this "special 
consideration" has distinct limitations. 
D.  A Common Solution: The Lessons from Nail House and Kelo v. 
New London 
Taken together, the Nail House case and Kelo represent a 
convergence in principles of Takings Law between the People's 
Republic of China and the United States. Both legal systems now 
allow for private property to be taken only if it is for public use and if 
the taking is accompanied by just compensation. In addition, both 
systems accept the notion that economic development or 
redevelopment by private developers is a "public use" justifying 
takings provided that economic development is being pursued 
according to a comprehensive community development plan. At the 
same time, two common problems have emerged: (1) how to define 
just compensation; and (2) whether takings of homes should be 
treated differently from other takings and subject to greater scrutiny. 
As for the first problem, while the text of China's new Property 
Law suggests that Chinese compensation for takings should cover 
replacement costs of taken property, rather than the American 
solution of compensating with fair market value, this potentially more 
expansive language has yet to translate to more than fair market 
value in practice. As for the second problem, whether the takings of 
homes should be subject to greater scrutiny, the most controversial 
Takings Law cases in the United States and China in recent years, 
Kelo and Nail House, have involved takings of private homes for 
economic development projects. This suggests that there is something 
about taking homes that is seen as more controversial than takings of 
other types of property in both societies, although it is unclear exactly 
what effect this really has, if any, on the outcome of these cases. 
Once this overall convergence in Takings Law principles is 
established, and the emergence of common related questions noted, a 
critical question emerges: what is behind this convergence? 
III.  DIFFERENT DRIVERS, SAME DESTINATION 
In comparative law, the appearance of common solutions and 
principles in different legal systems often reflects common underlying 
problems that those legal systems sought to address. As shall be 
discussed in the following sections, this is not the case when it comes 
to the development of similar solutions for takings law adopted by 
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both the United States and the China. Instead, prior to the recent 
convergence of law in this area these countries had remarkably 
different legal systems and property-law traditions, which led to 
radically different property-law problems. Furthermore, these nations 
had very different ideologies for addressing these problems. Each of 
these shall be addressed in turn. 
A.  Distinguishing Constitutional Structures 
When China's new Property Law was passed, Western media 
heralded it as China's "first law to protect private property 
explicitly."87 The material presented so far in this paper, as well as a 
reading of the Chinese constitution as amended in 2004, would 
suggest that these reports are mistaken. After all, in 2004 the Chinese 
Constitution was amended so that Article 13 reads that "[c]itizens' 
lawful private property is inviolable."88  Furthermore, the amendment 
added that "[t]he State, in accordance with law, protects the rights of 
citizens to private property and to its inheritance" and that "[t]he 
State may, in the public interest and in accordance with law, 
expropriate or requisition private property for its use and make 
compensation for the private property expropriated or 
requisitioned."89  These provisions certainly seem to amount to a 
recognition of private property rights as early as March 2004, three 
years before the passage of the new Property Law. So was the New 
York Times, along with other Western media sources, negligent in its 
research and reporting? 
Not entirely. The key to understanding the contradiction 
between these reports and the Chinese Constitution's provisions lies 
in the differing purposes of the U.S. and Chinese constitutions and 
the different weight that is accordingly attached to each in their 
respective legal systems. After all, the Constitution of the United 
States is explicitly "the Supreme Law of the Land," a position that the 
document has held in the American legal system for more than two 
centuries.90 By contrast, China does not have the same type of 
constitutional tradition. While China has had a formal constitution 
since its formation in 1949, the government has replaced that 
 
 87. Kahn, supra note 1. 
 88. Amendment to the Constitution, supra note 9, art. 22. 
 89. See id. 
 90. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. 
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constitution four times.91 China's first constitution was based on the 
1936 Constitution of the Soviet Union and, while "generally 
considered as a very positive constitutional document," it "hardly 
played an active role."92 While the ongoing disregard for the Chinese 
constitutions can in part be blamed on Soviet advisers or the repeated 
political upheavals of the Mao era, it is also instructive to note that 
the document that preceded it was a political programme passed in 
September 1949 that set forward the new nation's systemic goals.93 
In some ways, the Constitution of China today has retained its 
nature as a political document and agenda, with a long political 
preamble setting forth the current governing ideology that serves as a 
testament to its political nature.94 Furthermore, unlike the U.S. 
Constitution, which has only been amended twice in the last three and 
a half decades,95 the Chinese constitution has been regularly amended 
by the National People's Congress in recent years as "the political 
and economic situations in China have been changing in a frequent 
and rapid way," resulting in changes in party policy that then are 
adopted into constitutional provisions.96 
Setting aside the Chinese constitution's nature as more 
aspirational than the regulatory U.S. constitution, the exact 
placement of the property rights protections that were added to the 
constitution in 2004 further indicate that these provisions are unlikely 
to support a private right of action. After all, while the Chinese 
Constitution has an entire section (Chapter II) that defines "The 
Fundamental Rights and Duties of Citizens" akin to the Bill of Rights 
in the U.S. Constitution, the property rights protections related to 
takings are not found within this section.97 Instead, these property 
rights are found within a separate section entitled "General 
Principles" which includes lofty statements (e.g., "All power in the 
People's Republic of China belongs to the people") rather than the 
more specific listing of personal rights guaranteed in the fundamental 
rights section.98 
 
 91. Chu Guobin, Constitutional Law and State Structure, in CHINESE LAW 23, 29 (Wang 
Guiguo & John Mo eds., 1999). 
 92. Id. at 30. 
 93. Id. at 29. 
 94. XIAN FA , supra note 72, pmbl. 
 95. U.S. CONST. amend. XXVI; U.S. CONST. amend. XXVII. 
 96. See Guobin, supra note 91, at 33. 
 97. See XIAN FA, supra note 72, ch. II (2004) (P.R.C.). 
 98. See id. ch. I. 
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For these reasons, while the 2004 amendments were a step 
forward in recognizing property rights, these amendments did little to 
change the practical treatment of property law in the absence of 
concrete provisions in China's developing Civil Code that more 
clearly define private ownership and the contours of those broad 
principles of private property protection embraced in the 2004 
constitutional amendments.99 In short, the 2004 amendments to the 
constitution were akin to the provisions of a non-self-executing treaty: 
until they were translated into further implementing legislation, they 
had little effect in practice. 
B.  Common Law versus "Civil Law in Development" 
The new Property Law passed in March 2007 was intended to 
implement the 2004 amendments to the constitution and, as such, was 
seen as "an important component part of the civil code."100 It is 
perhaps instructive that virtually all developments in Chinese takings 
law come in the form of legislation, whereas most developments in 
U.S. takings law come in the form of opinions from the U.S. Supreme 
Court.  Accordingly, it is worth exploring how China's developing 
civil law system and U.S. common law traditions require different 
institutional drivers of reform. 
Key to the difference between U.S. and Chinese legal systems is 
the role of the judiciary. China, by adopting a civil law tradition, also 
"adopts the principle of legislative interpretation" and "entrusts the 
NPC Standing Committee with the power to interpret the 
Constitution and laws."101  Officially, Chinese courts have "the power 
to implement (not to interpret) the law,"102 much like civil law courts 
in the West are expected to apply, rather than interpret, the 
provisions of the civil code. Yet it is exceedingly hard for courts to 
implement general principles without some judicial interpretation, so 
that "the more detailed an interpretation . . . is given by the 
legislature, the easier it becomes for the court to implement."103 This 
contrasts sharply with the common law tradition of the United States, 
 
 99. See ZOU KEYUAN, CHINA'S LEGAL REFORM: TOWARDS THE RULE OF LAW 83 (2006). 
See also Pasternack, supra note 65 (quoting a legal expert who explains that "[o]fficials 
generally follow administrative rules in demolition cases that do not conform to constitutional 
property rights"). 
 100. See Wang Zhaoguo, supra note 13, § 1. 
 101. Wang Guiguo, The Legal System of China, in CHINESE LAW,  supra note 91, at 1, 19. 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. 
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which often relies on judicial interpretations to settle the meaning of 
the law when challenges arise – and which often results in the 
evolution of the law over time.104 
That is not to say that Chinese law does not "evolve" over time, 
but rather that it can only formally evolve through the activity of the 
political branches of the Chinese government. Accordingly, the 
political pressure resulting from the vast changes sweeping Chinese 
society led the National People's Congress to issue a string of laws 
relating to property and land use over the past decade to provide the 
courts with laws and interpretations to implement.105 Yet even before 
the new Property Law formally took effect, the National People's 
Congress announced that it would begin deliberation over a new 
urban and rural planning law to further reform the planning process 
that results in the comprehensive development plans used to justify 
takings.106 So while U.S. litigants continue to challenge the principles 
involved in takings law following Kelo, the National People's 
Congress continues to refine its version of takings law through its own 
deliberations. 
C.  The Role of the Media in Encouraging Reform 
Given the fact that Chinese property law primarily evolves 
through its political rather than judicial branches, one cannot 
understate the importance of political pressure to further encourage 
reforms of Chinese property laws. One also cannot understate the 
significance of the Chinese media in creating that pressure for change. 
This significance may seem strange to those familiar with the degree 
to which the Chinese media is controlled by the Chinese government; 
the Chinese government often suppresses media stories that could 
potentially cause a negative reaction against its policies, as 
exemplified by the Chinese government's attempt to force its 
"mainstream media . . . to abandon coverage of the 'nail house'" in 
Chongqing.107 Thanks to a determined group of bloggers and "citizen 
journalists," however, the story remained in the national spotlight 
 
 104. See, e.g, LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 202-27 (1973) 
(describing the evolution of property law in the United States). 
 105. See generally Administration of Urban Real Property Law, supra note 41 (publishing 
translations of a number of these laws and regulations relating to property). 
 106. NPC to Deliberate Draft Urban, Rural Planning Law, CHINACOURT, Apr. 14, 2007, 
http://en.chinacourt.org/public/detail.php?id=4177. 
 107. Pinghui, supra note 68. 
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leading up to and pressuring the passage of the new Property Law.108 
Ultimately, the news coverage even led the developers and local 
officials to give in to the building pressure before the new law even 
came into effect.109 Some Chinese activists, like Shenzhen property 
rights advocate Zou Tao, believe that this media attention will not 
"ultimately lead to a solution for ordinary citizens."110 As he argues, 
"[n]o other similar land disputes will receive that much attention 
again. The couple were [sic] rich and could afford to fight the 
developer. Most ordinary citizens don't have that many resources."111 
What Zou Tao ignores is that the Nail House case "has caused a 
major stir in academic and civic circles."112 As China Daily noted in a 
commentary on lessons learned from the case, Nail House added to a 
growing awareness among Chinese citizens of their rights and 
"unquestionably set an example of [people] standing up for their 
rights."113  Indeed, since the developers in Chongqing credit not only 
Wu Ping's media coverage but also her knowledge of the law for her 
victory, it is possible that, through her example and others like it, 
other citizens will start to understand the law and to challenge the 
Chinese government and developers further.114 
Furthermore, while the Chinese property activist Zou Tao points 
out that Nail House is unique because the couple involved is "rich 
and could afford to fight the developer,"115 the same factors come into 
play in challenges to takings in U.S. law. While the U.S. system on its 
face allows anyone to challenge government takings, the U.S. appeals 
process is expensive and therefore practical realities dictate that only 
those who are wealthy enough to afford a potentially protracted legal 
battle can effectively mount a challenge to takings of their property. 
Of course, even having enough money to mount a challenge to the 
taking of their properties and plenty of media attention did not help 
the residents of New London keep their properties.116 However, the 
 
 108. Id. See generally Dan Southerland, China's Media Controls: Could Bloggers Make a 
Difference?, CHINA BRIEF, Apr. 18, 2007, http://jamestown.org/terrorism/news/uploads/ 
cb_007_008.pdf (discussing the role of bloggers and "citizen journalists" in modern China). 
 109. See Pinghui, supra note 68. 
 110. Id. 
 111. Id. 
 112. Rui, supra note 24. 
 113. Lessons, supra note 18. 
 114. See Rui, supra note 24. 
 115. See  Pinghui, supra note 68. 
 116. See Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 484 (2005). 
_SCHMELZER_FMT6.DOC 11/25/2008  3:28:29 PM 
2008] PROPERTY LAW IN CHINA & THE UNITED STATES 153 
media attention, as in China, did create enormous political pressure.117 
As a result, 
Members of Congress have expressed their disapproval and 
30 state legislatures have taken action on bills and 
constitutional amendments proposing limits on the power of 
eminent domain. Governors in three states have declared 
moratoriums on property seizures.118 
Accordingly, while media pressure was not enough to influence the 
Court's decision in Kelo, the media responses to the Court's ruling 
have sparked a political and academic debate across the country 
much like Nail House has sparked a debate across China, and the 
products of that national debate may very well influence how the 
Court approaches the issue in the future. 
D.  Differing Traditional and Historical Roots of Property Law 
Once one understands what processes have been behind the 
evolution of the property laws of the United States and China over 
the last few decades, it is important to look at the traditional and 
historical roots of property law in each country to understand what 
problems the law has been evolving to address. As an overall 
examination of these histories and traditions shows, by the late 1980s 
the United States and China faced very different problems in 
property law. Yet these different historical and traditional roots, as 
different as they are, set the path for their legal convergence. 
As comparative real estate law expert Patrick A. Randolph, Jr., 
asserted before the U.S. Congress in 2002, "Until 1988, there was one 
simple law of real estate in China—the government owns 
everything . . . there were no individual rights in land and any 
arrangements that had been made could be unmade by government 
fiat."119 This was no secret; the 1982 Constitution specifically stated 
that all urban land belonged to the state, "merely confirming an 
existing situation which had developed gradually since 1956."120 This 
ability of the state to take control of land without compensation was 
standard process for a quarter of a century. By contrast, for nearly 
two centuries American property law rested on the "[b]asic building 
block of . . . perpetual and relatively comprehensive [private] 
 
 117. Coleman, supra note 28. 
 118. Id. 
 119. Overview, supra note 10, at 28. 
 120.  PEI, supra note 8, at 8. 
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ownership" known as the "fee simple absolute."121 Essentially, this is a 
legal fiction that assumes that complete title of ownership dates back 
to antiquity and stretches forward to the present, resulting in 
complicated local property recording systems that track the sale of 
property from one owner to another going back, in some cases, to 
before the nation's founding.122 As one would expect, the Chinese 
government, with its history of land takings and redistribution, does 
not espouse any similar claim of perpetual ownership.123 
As mentioned above, the U.S. tradition of fee simple absolute is 
based in part on fiction. After all, while the United States has had two 
centuries of property-law protections for its citizens, the United 
States, as a relatively young nation, can hardly trace its established 
property rights back to ancient times as can, perhaps, its English 
common law parent. Instead, the land of the United States was 
acquired in its own series of takings from Native Americans before 
and after the nation's founding. This is exemplified by the 1823 
Supreme Court case of Johnson v. M'Intosh,124 which involved two 
competing land claims in the State of Illinois.125 The plaintiffs had 
purchased title to the land from the chiefs of Native American tribes 
in the area who, according to the Court, "were in rightful possession 
of the land they sold," while the defendants, by contrast, had later 
purchased the same properties from the United States government.126  
Despite the usual American rule that an earlier purchase from a 
legitimate property-holder should be the more valid title, the Court in 
Johnson ruled in favor of the defendants, declaring that "[c]onquest 
gives a title which the Courts of the conqueror cannot deny."127 
With this basic history in mind, the current privatization of 
China's land after more than 26 years of "conquest" and seizures by 
the Chinese government may not be that different from America's 
own property foundations. As Gerald Korngold, a professor at New 
York Law School and former dean of Case Western University 
School of Law, summarizes, 
Resolution of undocumented and imperfect land claims in 
favor of ordinary American settlers at the dawn of the 
 
 121. Overview, supra note 10, at 29. 
 122. Id. 
 123. See, e.g., Overview, supra note 10, at 28; PEI, supra note 8, at 8. 
 124. 21 U.S. 543 (1823). 
 125. Id. at 543. 
 126. Id. at 572. 
 127. Id. at 588. 
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American Republic was a necessary predicate to social and 
political stability . . . [T]he American government's 
validation of these land claims created property rights in 
average Americans that financed economic development 
and growth. While there are clear historical, economic and 
cultural differences with China, the lesson of the American 
experience is worth remembering as the Chinese address 
issues of land ownership and government action.128 
While China's past seizures and current privatization may have 
parallels with the state of American property law at the nation's 
founding, by the late 1980s the United States and China had legal 
traditions that looked very different from each other, and these 
differences were evident in the problems each nation faced. 
By the 1980s, after 26 years of nationalization of property, the 
inefficiencies in the centrally-planned economy's land allocation and 
utilization were quite apparent to the Chinese leadership.129 With all 
land in the state's hands, individual Chinese citizens had little 
incentive to invest in developing that land, leaving huge burdens on 
the state that could not be met.130 Accordingly, the Chinese 
government began to experiment with land privatizations to provide 
incentives to people to more efficiently develop the land. Wang 
Zhaoguo of the Standing Committee of the National People's 
Congress explained that since "the people's living standards ha[d] 
continued to improve" under these initiatives, the National People's 
Congress subsequently passed the new Property Law to further 
stimulate the "people's initiative to create and accumulate wealth and 
to promote social harmony."131 
The United States, by contrast, hardly lacked clear property 
protections. Instead, the problems the United States faced in the 
1980s were those of distressed municipalities like New London whose 
attempted plans for economic redevelopment and rejuvenation were 
often stymied by a few private property owners that refused to sell 
the land needed for redevelopment. What happened in New London 
is a good example of this problem; while the city won the right to take 
the properties of the several remaining holdouts in the end, by the 
time the city was able to defeat the challenges to the taking, "builders 
 
 128. Gerald Korngold, Letter to the Editor, China's Land Seizures, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 24, 
2006, at A20, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2006/01/24/opinion/l24china.html. 
 129. See PEI, supra note 8, at vii. 
 130. Id. at 36. 
 131. Wang Zhaoguo, supra note 13, § 3(5). 
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who once considered projects [had] moved on, deterred by the 
controversy," leaving a "site [that] is now a flat expanse of dusty, 
rock-strewn soil dotted by the few remaining houses."132 With Kelo 
established, however, local governments can now be more sure that 
they will be able to secure the land they need for economic 
redevelopment, even if that comes at the expense of private U.S. 
property owners having a little less security in the perpetual nature of 
their titles. 
In short, the United States and the People's Republic of China 
by the late 1980s had nearly polar opposite property law systems, as 
well as nearly opposite problems. China had no institution of 
property protection and was learning that having some would 
stimulate economic prosperity, while the United States had a deeply-
rooted institution of strong property protection and was moving 
toward reducing those protections for the sake of economic 
prosperity. Somehow, however, these distinct problems resulted in 
convergence upon a very similar Takings Law solution. 
IV.  THE NON-CONVERGENCE OF GOVERNING 
IDEOLOGIES: A DECEPTIVE UNITY 
Given the convergence of some property-law standards between 
the People's Republic of China and the United States, it is easy to 
assume that there has been convergence in ideology as well. A 
cursory glance at the changing political statements of China's top 
leaders might support such a view. 
After all, on July 31, 1951, Mao Tse-Tung proclaimed before a 
group of assembled party leaders that "We are now carrying out a 
revolution . . . in the social system, the change from private to public 
ownership . . ."133 This, of course, was not unique to Mao: as Karl 
Marx wrote over a century earlier in 1848, "the theory of the 
Communists may be summed up in the single sentence: Abolition of 
private property."134 Yet in March 2007, half a century after Mao 
declared the beginning of his campaign to eliminate all private 
property, the National People's Congress passed a law firmly 
protecting private property in the People's Republic. As Wang 
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Zhaoguo, vice-chairman of the Standing Committee of the National 
People's Congress, explained on the floor of the National People's 
Congress at the time, "[e]ffective protection of private property of 
citizens is not only . . . what the Party stands for, but also the general 
aspiration and urgent demand of the people."135 From these 
statements, it would seem that the Chinese Communist Party has 
abandoned communism in its embrace of private property and 
adopted the values of the capitalist West. Yet looks can be deceiving. 
If China's Constitution is any guide to the political aspirations of 
the country's leadership,136 its sizable Preamble declaring that "the 
Chinese people . . . will continue to adhere to the people's democratic 
dictatorship and the socialist road" and that "class struggle will 
continue to exist within certain bounds for a long time to come" 
should not be ignored.137 Reconciling the two sets of statements is 
fairly easy: while the Chinese Communist Party recognizes the 
important gains that privatization has brought and seeks to encourage 
those gains as its people's living standards improve, its goal of a 
socialist, classless state has not changed. China may have introduced a 
new law protecting private property, but the Chinese name of its 
ruling party, literally translated as "the public-property party," has 
not changed.138 
While on the surface it may seem like "the party [only] pretends 
fealty" to the principle of public ownership,139 it is entirely possible for 
the Chinese Communist Party to "balance[] the principles of a 
socialist government with the necessity of providing for private 
ownership as an engine for economic growth."140 Similarly, there are 
few that would claim that the U.S. has abandoned its ideological 
attachment to protecting private property rights by endorsing 
eminent domain as part of development plans. 
Indeed, the facts dictate that public property remains strongly 
entrenched in Chinese society, where most farmland has remained 
under collective ownership since the Cultural Revolution and farmers 
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only hold short term leases on their land.141 Even if the Property Law 
dictates that such leases will be automatically renewed when they 
expire, the law does not specify for how long or at what price.142 
Moreover, "even outside agriculture it is often unclear whether a 
'private' enterprise is really owned by individuals or by a local 
government or party unit,"143 just as urban tenants, though given 
permanent occupancy rights in the 1990s, have never been given 
actual ownership rights over their apartments or the land that they 
are built upon.144 As such, public ownership is still dominant in many 
ways in modern China. 
Clearly, the People's Republic of China has not adopted the 
American legal fiction and ideology that property is a natural and 
perpetual right worthy of government protection, as was proposed by 
English theorists like John Locke.  Instead, the Chinese Communist 
Party has merely decided to protect private property rights as a 
practical solution to past failings in centrally-planned investment. As 
such, while "the Property Law embraces concepts that are similar to 
familiar American concepts,"145 these concepts should not be confused 
with ideological goals. Similarly, the United States, in embracing 
eminent domain as a method of economic rejuvenation, has not 
embraced the idea of the general welfare above the protection of 
individual property rights, an idea still embraced by the Chinese 
Constitution. Instead, the U.S. Supreme Court has merely chosen to 
expand over time its conception of what types of "public use" justify 
takings as a means of addressing the practical problems faced by its 
own distressed municipalities. 
Although faced with vastly different legal systems, historical and 
traditional backgrounds, and social and economic problems, the 
United States and China converged upon a common solution in 
takings law, partially obscuring the world of differences it took to get 
to that solution.  While both countries may have reached a common 
solution to takings law questions, however, it is important to 
remember how they reached those solutions, what forces led to this 
convergence of standards, and what forces remain opposed to these 
changes. In recent years, the United States and China have distinctly 
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taken a step closer toward reconciling very different systems of 
property. That said, anyone assuming that this convergence is 
complete, continuing, or irreversible would do well to reconsider that 
assumption. 
 
